The Impact of Pressure on Risk Evaluation in Decision-Making: A Case Study of Three Major Accidents

Boxuan Liu

doi:10.54097/sa9h3g83

Authors

Boxuan Liu

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54097/sa9h3g83

Keywords:

Decision Making Under Pressure, Risk Evaluation, Organizational Accidents.

Abstract

Decision-making is critical in organizational and managerial activities, and stress is an important factor influencing decision-making. This study examines how stress affects risk assessment and decision-making by analyzing three major accident cases (the Fukuchiyama Line derailment, the NASA Challenger STS-51L accident, and Boeing 737 Max 8 design problems). In the Fukuchiyama Line accident, the driver ignored the risk of speeding the train for fear of company penalties. In the Challenger accident, NASA ignored the risk of a leaking O-ring due to political, media, and internal cultural pressures. In the Boeing 737 Max 8 accident, Boeing ignored potential risks in the design of the MCAS system and a single sensor in an effort to catch up with competitor Airbus. This study points out that pressure can lead decision makers to ignore risks with disastrous consequences and suggests that the quality of decision making can be improved by information gathering, seeking expert advice and taking known issues seriously.

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