Can Wang Yangming’s Theory of Conscience and The Unity of Knowledge and Action Qualify as A Kind of Knowing-How?

Abstract

This paper explores whether Wang Yangming’s concept of “conscience” can be classified under Ryle’s epistemological category of “knowing-how.” It first clarifies that Yangming’s conscience constitutes a transcendental, intrinsic, and proactive moral intuition, characterized by the core tenets of “the mind is the principle” and “the unity of knowledge and action.” Conscience emphasizes the inseparability of moral judgment and behavioral inclination. Subsequently, the paper introduces Ryle’s distinction between “knowing-how” and “knowing-that,” noting that the former represents an observable, disposition-based capacity manifested in practice. It argues that conscience structurally aligns with knowing-how, which must actualize itself through moral practice, and as a dispositional excellence, it manifests as stable yet flexible moral wisdom. By addressing objections such as whether conscience inherently involves behavioral inclinations and whether well-intentioned but ineffective actions constitute counterexamples, this paper emphasizes that true knowledge necessarily includes behavioral inclinations. Even under external constraints, conscience remains identifiable through its preliminary behavioral inclinations. Ultimately, this paper not only argues for the legitimacy of conscience as a moral form of knowing-how but also uses this framework to reflect upon and expand the moral dimensions of the concept of disposition within Ryle’s theory.