The Multiple Logics Behind the U.S.–China Section 301 Tariffs: A Cross-Disciplinary Analysis of International, Political, and Economic Factors

Authors

  • Boyi Zhu

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54097/enhypg07

Keywords:

U.S.–China relations, tariff policy, international relations, political economy, trade policy.

Abstract

The U.S.-China trade conflict flared up again on May 14, 2024, when the U.S. finally decided to restore Section 301 tariffs on Chinese goods, four years after the Trump administration ended its review of China’s policies. This paper uses methods from international relations, economics, and the political economy to explain how strategic, domestic, and economic factors shaped the design and implementation of the tariffs. High tariffs were levied on Chinese exports of strategic significance, mainly extending to electric vehicles, semiconductors, and clean energy products. Phased implementation and exclusion policies mitigated their economic impact and potential inflationary effects within the U.S. Overall, the levying of high tariffs was a strategically motivated response aimed at national security. At the same time, the implementation was economically prudent because it allowed for alternative supply sources and limited pass-through costs. The tariffs enjoyed political support among specific industries and labor groups ahead of an election year and was backed by related programs such as CHIPS and the Inflation Reduction Act. Internationally, coordination with allies and the weakened enforcement of rules by the World Trade Organization also provided a favorable environment for unilateral action. In summary, this paper provides an integrated explanation for the tariff escalation in 2024 and suggests testable hypotheses for further research on price pass-through, trade diversion, and welfare effects.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

References

[1] Cavallo A, Gopinath G, Neiman B, Tang J. Tariff pass-through at the border and at the store: Evidence from US trade policy. American Economic Review: Insights, 2021, 3(1): 19-34.

[2] Fajgelbaum P D, Goldberg P K, Kennedy P J, Khandelwal A K. The return to protectionism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2020, 135(1): 1-55.

[3] Handley K, Kamal F, Monarch R. Rising import tariffs, falling exports: When modern supply chains meet old-style protectionism. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2025, 17(1): 208-238.

[4] Zhang K H. U.S.-China economic links and technological decoupling. The Chinese Economy, 2023, 56(5): 1-13.

[5] Farrell H, Newman A L. Weaponized interdependence: How global economic networks shape state coercion. International Security, 2019, 44(1): 42-79.

[6] Lehdonvirta V, Wú B, Hawkins Z. Weaponised interdependence in a bipolar world: How economic forces and security interests shape the global reach of U.S. and Chinese cloud data centres. Review of International Political Economy, 2025,1-26.

[7] Grossman G M, Helpman E. Protection for sale. American Economic Review, 1994, 84(4): 833-850.

[8] Lake J, Nie J. The 2020 U.S. presidential election and Trump’s wars on trade and health insurance. European Journal of Political Economy, 2022, 73: 102338.

[9] Li X. Conceptualizing China-U.S. rivalry through the lens of globalization in an era of changing structure-agency dynamics. Globalizations, 2025: 1-19.

[10] McDonagh N. U.S.-China competition, world order and economic decoupling: Insights from cultural realism. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2025, 79(3): 1-21.

[11] Bagwell K, Staiger R W. The design of trade agreements. NBER Working Papers, 2016.

Downloads

Published

16-04-2026

Issue

Section

Articles

How to Cite

Zhu, B. (2026). The Multiple Logics Behind the U.S.–China Section 301 Tariffs: A Cross-Disciplinary Analysis of International, Political, and Economic Factors. Journal of Education and Educational Research, 18(1), 1042-1049. https://doi.org/10.54097/enhypg07